ESPN.com - Major League Baseball

MLB

  Scores
  Schedules
  Standings
  Statistics
  Transactions
  Injuries: AL | NL
  Players
  Weekly Lineup
  Message Board
  Minor Leagues
  MLB Stat Search

Clubhouses

Sport Sections

TODAY: Monday, May 15

February Archives

By Rob Neyer

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1
This is the last column on the Team of the Aughts. I promise. Just a few more reactions from you, the readers, and then we'll be done with this ... until 2010, when I expect I'll still be here even if you're not.

I should have mentioned Tim Hudson when discussing the starters. And to a lesser extend, Kris Benson. In one of Peter Gammons' current offerings, Hudson is listed as the American League's top candidate as a future No. 1 starter (by scouts and pitching coaches), just ahead of Freddy Garcia, who I did mention (if only in passing).

Now, about the relievers ...

Rob, I was just looking at the poll for relief pitcher and began to wonder,"Where's John Rocker?" Granted, there's now extra pressure on him to perform, but this is a guy/animal that thrives on the intensity of the moment. He at least deserves a mention, don't you think? John Harman

It's funny, a number of readers wrote to accuse me of political correctness. About the same number, in fact, who accused me of insensitivity a few months ago. I think that I'm comfortably in the middle, neither here nor there, neither fish nor fowl, neither black nor white ... oops, maybe that last one wasn't appropriate.

Anyway, I left Rocker out of the poll for two reasons, neither of them directly related to his stated views on people who don't look like he does.

One, he's been a closer for only one season. And two, he wasn't that great last year. I mean, he was great, no question. He saved 38 games, and allowed just 47 hits in 72 innings while striking out 104 enemy hitters. But Rocker also walked 37 hitters, twice as many as Mariano Rivera in almost the same number of innings.

But it goes deeper than that. Rocker plays the game with a football mentality, sprinting in from the bullpen and bellowing like a hippopotamus with a fourpenny nail lodged in his hindquarters. Baseball's not football, however, and I wonder how long a relief pitcher who relies on such intensity can maintain that intensity, and hence his effectiveness. Rob Dibble was a guy like that, and for a while he looked like the most intimidating pitcher who ever lived.

Dibble's career as an effective pitcher lasted five seasons.

Am I generalizing? Absolutely. Am I making possibly unfounded assumptions about what drives Rocker, what makes him successful? You bet. And to tell you the truth, I'd like to see my favorite team trade for John Rocker, because he's a fine pitcher. But we're talking about the very best players of the next decade, and in such rarefied atmosphere it only takes a negative or two to disqualify someone from serious consideration. And when I look at Rocker, I do see a negative or two. Or three.

(And before you ask, here's what I think about the one-month suspension handed Rocker by Commissioner Bud ... Gammons pegged this one exactly. Selig felt compelled to make some sort of silly statement, but he knows that the Players Association will appeal, and the suspension will be either shortened or eliminated altogether. As it should be. I am disgusted, though not surprised, that baseball wastes all this energy slapping Rocker's wrists not in the name of some greater good, but in the name of pointless public relations. Will baseball fans spurn their favorite teams if Rocker isn't punished? Of course not. Meanwhile, Pedro Astacio and Bobby Chouinard go merrily about their business, reporting to spring training with the rest of their teammates, most of whom express no disgust with their wife-beating pals.)

Onward ... Surprisingly, not a single reader complained about the absence of Scott Williamson from yesterday's column. Shoot, the guy did win the Rookie of the Year award, and while he saved only 19 games, that was due in large part to Reds manager Jack McKeon's unorthodox bullpen strategies.

So what about Williamson? He's 24, and posted a 2.41 ERA last season in 94 innings. I ask this question because I want to present a note from Rany Jazayerli, an occasional ESPN.com contributor. So, here's Rany ...

Let's take a look at all the rookie relievers (other than Williamson) who finished among the top three in the last 15 years of Rookie of the Year voting:

John Hudek (1994 NL): 2nd with 27 points
Greg McMichael (1993 NL): 2nd with 40 points
Gregg Olson (1989 AL): 1st with 136 points
Bryan Harvey (1988 AL): 2nd with 49 points
Todd Worrell (1986 NL): 1st with 118 points
Mark Eichhorn (1986 AL): 3rd with 23 points

Hudek really doesn't belong here, as he somehow finished second after merely 39 decent innings.

McMichael was actually one of the more underrated relievers of the 1990s, posting good (or better) ERAs in each of his first five seasons. But it's clear that his rookie season (2.06, 19 saves in 21 chances) was his best by far.

Eichhorn was amazing as a rookie, but like McMichael his success was less fastball than delivery, which was sidearm. He threw 157 innings his rookie season, all in relief, which looks like a misprint today. So his slow, painful decline was hardly a shock.

That leaves Olson, Harvey and Worrell, all of them hard throwers, as good comps for Williamson. Olson continued to pitch well until he blew out his arm in 1993. Worrell, who had a 2.08 ERA as a rookie, then posted ERAs of 2.66, 3.00, and 2.96 ... before he too went down (with elbow and shoulder injuries) and missed all of 1990 and 1991. Harvey had a 2.13 ERA as a rookie, then 3.44, 3.22, and 1.60 (his best season) before suffering arm problems in 1992 that limited him to 29 innings and worried the Angels so much that they left him unprotected in the Expansion Draft. The Marlins grabbed him, he had another terrific year (1.70 ERA, 45 saves) ... and then blew out his arm for good.

So what do we have? All three pitched well after their rookie seasons. But with the exception of Harvey's 1991 and 1993, none could match their rookie years, and all suffered serious injuries within five years.

Actually, all you have to do is look at the Royals' new closer to see how risky it is to bet on a good young reliever. Compare Ricky Bottalico's 1995 to Williamson's 1999:

            IP  H  W  K  HR   ERA
Bottalico   88 50 42  87  7  2.46
Williamson  93 54 43 107  8  2.41

Bottalico's ERAs since his rookie year: 2.46, 3.19, 3.65, 6.44, 4.91 ...

Thanks, Rany. Pretty compelling stuff. Another name to consider: Kerry Ligtenberg, who finished just fourth in the Rookie of the Year vote in 1998 despite 30 saves and a 2.71 ERA (he should have finished third, ahead of Travis Lee). Of course, Ligtenberg also wound up getting cut open by a scalpel, thanks to a torn elbow ligament.

What's missing here is a reason. Why have so many promising relievers suffered serious injuries? Are the cases of Olson, Harvey and Worrell, along with Bottalico and Ligtenberg, relevant in a discussion of Scott Williamson? The data is sobering, that's for sure. Williamson did suffer from shoulder tendinitis late last season, and his ERA did go up every month after May. Given all this, I simply don't see how we can consider him with guys like Billy Wagner and Ugueth Urbina.

One reader made a great point, which is that there's a real good chance that we don't know the Closer of the Aughts yet. He may well be a starter in the minor leagues right now, just waiting for the conversion to relief pitching that makes him a superstar in the bigs.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3
Yesterday, ESPN.com ran a poll asking us to decide who should be baseball's highest-paid player. I voted for Mark McGwire, and I'll tell you why.

In terms of wins and losses, and economic impact of those wins and losses, no player is worth $18 million per season. The math just doesn't work out. Let's say Juan Gonzalez -- and we'll get back to him later -- winds up signing for nearly $18 million per season. Now, the difference between Gonzalez and an average major league right fielder is perhaps four wins. Or three.

What does the average right fielder make per season? Well, I'd guess somewhere in the neighborhood of $3 million. Now, I'd like to see you demonstrate, with your slide rule and your ball bearings and your gauze pads, how four extra victories can possibly be worth $15 million.

I don't think it can be done. Yes, if those four wins are the difference between reaching the postseason and not reaching the postseason, you might have an argument. But how many teams miss (or make) the playoffs by four games or fewer?

In 1999, the answer to that question was ... three. Before their one-game playoff, the Mets and Reds tied for the wild card. And the Astros finished just a game ahead of the Reds before that playoff.

Thirty teams, and for only three of them did four games make a difference.

Hold on there, pardner! Before you commence to shootin' off them e-mails, let's parley. No, I'm not suggesting that teams should limit themselves to $3 million players. You get 25 of those guys, and you'll have a $75 million payroll and a .500 record. That, my friends, is a lousy combination.

Let's get back to McGwire for a moment. He's a great player, certainly one of the most devastating hitters in the world. He's not the best player in the game, because he adds little on the basepaths or at first base. But he's got something that very few other players have. He puts fannies in the seats. Have you been to a Cardinals game lately? Not only is the ballpark full (or close to it), but a good percentage of the fannies are in the seats for batting practice. Just think how much all those fannies are spending on beer and soda pop and nachos and frozen lemonade.

Now, back to my digression. If you're going to compete, you need superstars. Why? Because superstars are four or five games better than an average player. If you've got three superstars and five guys in the lineup who are average or slightly worse, you can win. And if we assume that you need superstars to win, you almost have to pay somebody $18 million per season, even if there's no way to make the math work.

The next question, of course, is "Does Juan Gonzalez deserve to be that somebody?"

I've said some unkind (if true) things about Gonzalez in the past, but he's a great player. Overrated? Yes, because big RBI guys who don't walk much are always overrated. But still, he sure looks nice in the middle of the lineup.

But $18 million? That would make Gonzalez, for the moment at least, the highest-paid player in the game. But is he close to being the best player in the game?

Hardly.

Crudely put, a player is asked to perform at three "spots" for his club: at the plate, in the field, and on the bases. Or four, if you want to count "in the clubhouse," but we'll leave that one alone today.

At the plate, Gonzalez is very, very good. A lot of people would say that he's great, and some years they would be right.

In the field, Gonzalez is adequate at best. He's tentative on fly balls, and his strong throwing arm doesn't compensate for his limited range.

On the bases, Gonzalez gives you almost nothing. He's stolen five bases over the last two seasons and hit two triples. No, stolen bases and triples aren't important statistics, but they do indicate speed. And Gonzalez doesn't have much.

So that's one positive and two negatives. Of course, this doesn't necessarily mean that Gonzalez isn't a great player. For a right fielder, hitting is more important than defense and baserunning combined. But this does mean that Gonzalez isn't an all-around player, and it seems to me that if you're going to give a guy $18 million, he should be either a good all-around player or a truly terrific hitter.

But beyond all that, here's the biggest problem I have with Gonzalez ... he can't stay healthy. I discussed this in detail just last week, so I won't belabor the point here. But if the last four seasons are any indication, the Tigers shouldn't count on Gonzalez for more than about 140 games per season. That means, over the course of those four seasons, Gonzalez will miss about 80 games -- half a season. Figure in the reported length of the contract, eight years, and Gonzalez will miss an entire season's worth of games over those eight years.

On the other hand, in a way all this "highest-paid player" stuff is irrelevant. So Gonzalez gets the biggest contract. How long will he be the highest-paid player? In five years, he probably won't even be among the top 20 (though if he's still playing well, he'll want to renegotiate).

While we're on the subject of players making a lot of money, let us return to a subject of columns past; namely, the inexplicable fascination that baseball executives seem to have with Wilfredo Cordero.

Sure, he's a better hitter now than he was when he first came up. But that's not saying much. Cordero's slugging percentage the last three seasons combined was .448, nothing special. His on-base percentage was a pathetic .326 ... nowhere near acceptable for a major league right fielder with a .448 slugging percentage.

Sure, he did wallop the ol' horsehide last season. But that was only 194 at-bats. And why only 194 at-bats? Because Cordero, as usual, couldn't stay in the lineup. His games played for the last four seasons read like this: 59, 140, 96, 54. Where Juan Gonzalez is merely gimpy, Cordero's been as fragile as your typical 14-year-old's ego. So if you're the general manager of a major league team -- any major league team -- do you sign this guy to a three-year deal for $3 million per?

Thickening the plot is a fine, generally healthy fellow named Chad Hermansen. Originally a top prospect at shortstop, Hermansen quickly demonstrated that his skills were more suited to the outfield. Though he's fast and has been playing center field in the minors, that position in Pittsburgh is apparently blocked by Brian Giles. That leaves left and right fields. But Pirates manager Gene Lamont sounds like he's committed to Cordero in right field. Why? Because that's where Cordero wants to play. And as Lamont says, "We got him to supply offense, and if he's not confident on defense he's doing a good job, it might take away from his offense."

Why anyone would get Cordero to supply offense, I don't know. But it's done. The problem is that it looks like Hermansen might head back to Triple-A Nashville this year, even though he's already spent two seasons there, and slugged .520 the first year and .530 the second.

Make no mistake, Hermansen's still got some work to do. He strikes out roughly once per game, and his OBP would be even lower than Cordero's. But here's the crux of the thing: the Pirates aren't ready to win anyway. They're still at least a year away, so why not let Hermansen learn in the big leagues? Does a third year in Nashville really do anyone any good?

Oh, and if you're wondering about left field, Al Martin's penciled in there, and ably backed up by Bruce Aven. Yes, the Pirates could make a trade to open up a spot for Hermansen. But I still can't see the point in signing, for three years, a one-dimensional player like Cordero, especially when his one dimension ain't really so hot.

In today's game, the Pirates are the little guys, the Davids, and I suspect most of us enjoy seeing the little guys succeed. But the little guys have to rely on more than a slingshot. They have to know how to use it.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7
Just back from a long weekend, and found a pile of e-messages similar to the following ...

Rob, Brian Hunter won his arbitration case with the Mariners, who will now have to pay him $2.45 million this season. How, how, how could Brian Hunter win anything after posting a .280(!) OBP last year? Sickened in Seattle, C. Thomas Frippett

All these letters, while possessed of the proper indignation, nonetheless miss the point.

The problem here isn't that a panel of arbitrators was stupid enough to "award" $2.45 million to Hunter, rather than the $1.75 million figure proposed by the Mariners. Everyone knows that the arbitration process is flawed, that arbitrators often barely know the difference between home runs and earned runs.

The problem here isn't that Hunter (and his agent), after a season that might charitably be described as "pathetic," had the chutzpah to request a 40 percent raise. Like any good capitalist, Hunter asked for what he thought he could get. In this country, that's considered smart business.

No, the problem here is that the Mariners allowed this to happen at all. A lot of people seem to think the M's were somehow forced into the arbitration process. But they -- and other clubs -- aren't, not at all. Late last year, the Mariners had a choice. They could either offer Hunter a contract -- the dollar amount just a formality, a sort of place-holder until arbitration figures were submitted by both sides -- or they could have simply declined to offer Hunter a contract by the designated date. That's called "non-tendering."

Now, if the M's had non-tendered Hunter, he would immediately have become a free agent, free to sign with any major league club ... including the Mariners. And the M's would have had plenty of leverage in any negotiations with Hunter. First of all, he's a Pacific Northwest native, grew up around two hours from Safeco Field. And second, the M's would undoubtedly have been one of the few teams with any interest in Hunter.

The natural reaction here is to say, "It's only two-and-half-million bucks, so what's the big deal?" True, $2.45 million is just a small fraction of Seattle's projected payroll, somewhere between three and four percent. In the context of salaries, $2.45 million is essentially nothing. But in terms of the team's overall budget, $2.45 million is plenty. It might well be the difference between making a profit and not making a profit. Or, looking at it from another direction, how far would $2.45 million go if plowed back into player development, international scouting and the like?

Pat Gillick, the new Mariners general manager, is a smart guy. I'd say he's one of the five or six best GM's out there. He blew this one, though. Like so many of his colleagues, Gillick simply didn't have the guts to non-tender a mediocre player, and it cost his team millions of dollars.

And then you have the Yankees. No, they're not perfect. But they're showing brilliant restraint in their dealings with Mariano Rivera, at least if Bob Klapisch knows what he's talking about. According to Klapisch, "the Yankees seem willing to have this fight."

Which fight? Apparently Rivera (and again, his agent) thinks he should be paid as much as top starters make. Well, maybe not as much. But close enough. Klapisch reports that Rivera's asking for a four-year deal worth almost $50 million. That works out to $12.5 million per season, whereas the top starters are now making approximately $15 million.

What is Rivera worth? I've gone round and round on this issue, and I've concluded that closers are worth about two-thirds of starters. I base this not only on statistical analysis, but also on the existing pay scales and historical Cy Young balloting. Everybody loves to stress the importance of relievers, but when it comes time to sign free agents or vote for Cy Youngs, it's the starters who get the goodies. As they should.

However, one might logically argue that closers are more valuable if their teams reach the postseason, because the games are generally tighter, and thus the closer will pitch in more pressure situations as a percentage of games. I would tend to agree with this argument ... but I don't think it's worth an extra $2.5 million.

Then again, what's $2.5 million to the Yankees? For all their tough talk -- the Yankees have supposedly offered a four-year, $36 million deal -- I suspect that when push comes to shove, they won't let Rivera get away. He probably won't get $12.5 million, but perhaps a bit more than $11 million per season. And given the current and near-future market value for top starters, I'd say that $11 million is just about right.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9
Continuing the theme of "e-mails I often receive," here's another of those:

Hey Rob, In your column Tuesday, you referred to Pat Gillick as one of the "five or six best GMs out there." I couldn't let this go without a call for elaboration. Obviously, Gillick has to be considered one of the five top general managers (a strong candidate for numero uno, in fact). But who are the others? I know this is a different kind of analysis than comparing players; stats don't cover the many variables and constraints that GM's are up against (how do you quantify the "Peter Angelos factor"?). But in a general, unscientific way, please give us your top GMs. -- John Armstrong

Gee, John, does it have to be unscientific? Because one could construct a crude rating system for general managers, the key components of which might be victories (adjusted for financial resources), talent developed by the farm system, and value gained and lost in trades.

Such a system, crude as it might be, would take me a week to construct ... so I suppose general and unscientific is the way to go after all, at least this time.

I'm not going to bother trying to rank them, because there are simply too many variables, too many unknowns. But let's start with Gillick since he inspired this discussion.

In a way, I suppose we're jumping the gun a little bit here. Based on what he's already done in Seattle, in some quarters Gillick is practically getting credit for a 95-win season, but of course the season hasn't even started yet. If the Mariners go 77-85 in 2000, will we still consider Gillick one of the top five GMs?

Then again, Gillick does boast a mighty impressive r�sum�. He built the Toronto Blue Jays from the ground up, and among his many intelligent actions were grabbing George Bell in a Rule 5 draft and hiring Bobby Cox to manage the Jays. I probably don't need to tell you that Toronto was the best club in the American League from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. He ran a pretty good Baltimore club a few years ago, too. Of course, this piece isn't about the best general managers of a few years ago, but rather the best of this year. Based on the moves he's made since taking over the Mariners, Gillick seems to have retained his skills.

Before we go any further, I should point out that some GMs have less power than others. This knowledge comes in handy when we're divvying up the credit for the success of various teams. Thus, you'll not see Yankees GM Brian Cashman here, or Diamondbacks GM Joe Garagiola Jr. While Cashman is certainly an intelligent executive, the fact is that player personnel director Mark Newman has a large hand in decisions, and so does The Boss. In Arizona, most of the power is wielded by Jerry Colangelo and Buck Showalter.

Boston's Dan Duquette is a guy who wields power. Red Sox ownership gives Duquette a free hand, and he's done a great job. People said the Red Sox couldn't win without Roger Clemens. They won. People said the Red Sox couldn't win without Mo Vaughn. They won.

Duquette has made some fine moves: plucking Tim Wakefield from the scrap heap; making a closer out of Tom Gordon; giving Troy O'Leary and Brian Daubach the chances they deserved. Yet "The Duke" has never quite gotten the credit he deserves, in large part because he hasn't been a great friend to the media.

Jim Bowden has done a great job with relatively limited resources in Cincinnati, and it's a bit of a shame that he may be remembered mostly for whether or not he was able (willing?) to acquire a Kid named Griffey. Bowden, still a relatively young man, relies on a team of older men to advise him on baseball matters. But this only raises him in my eyes, because it takes a secure, intelligent man to both take advice and make something of it.

Let's see ... Gillick, Duquette, Bowden ... I promised you five, didn't I? All right, I'll go with the two Texans, Gerry Hunsicker of the Astros and Doug Melvin of the Rangers.

Melvin took over the Rangers after the 1994 season. (And when I write that he took over, I mean that he took over, as Melvin has nearly absolute power.) The Rangers had been in Texas for 23 years, and could boast the grand total of zero postseason appearances. In the five seasons since, the Rangers have won three American League West titles. Of course, they were obliterated by the Yankees in each of those Octobers, but it's still an impressive achievement.

Melvin made a stinker of a deal when he traded Fernando Tatis to the Cardinals a couple of seasons ago, but I think he'll come out smelling like roses when it comes to the recent Juan Gonzalez deal.

Exactly 13 months after Melvin got the big job in Arlington, Gerry Hunsicker took over in Houston. In the four seasons since, the Astros finished second, then won three straight NL Central titles. Like the Rangers, the Astros have suffered postseason woes. But let's focus on the good things Hunsicker has done. He hired Larry Dierker, a broadcaster fer crissakes, to manage. He stole Jose Lima and Daryle Ward from the Tigers, and also traded for Moises Alou and Carl Everett. The farm system has produced a steady supply of pitchers and hitters. So what's not to like?

I seriously considered Oakland's Billy Beane, but I don't think we can place him among the elite until one of his clubs wins something. Beane does operate under severe financial restraints, but the object is still to win ballgames. He's my favorite current GM, though, because he actually believes in things like on-base percentage. (Revolutionary!)

I also considered John Hart, who certainly is responsible for building the powerhouse in Cleveland. Hart should forever be remembered for signing Cleveland's young stars to long-term contracts back in the early 1990s, thus saving his club untold millions of dollars. But now? The farm system is not strong, and Hart is faced with the likelihood of losing the best hitter on his club after this season. There's no competition in the AL Central, but you'd like to see the Tribe at least get close to 100 wins, a figure they haven't reached since 1995.

And what of John Schuerholz? He'd have been one of my top choices five years ago, but at this point I'm not sure how much of Atlanta's success is Schuerholz and how much is Ted Turner's millions. But Schuerholz certainly deserves his share of the credit, and I wonder if I'm doing him a disservice here.

Speaking of credit and disservices, general managers don't get the credit that they once did. There was a time when, if you built a truly great team, you might eventually be elected to the Hall of Fame. Those days are no longer.

Larry MacPhail had a hand in building the late 1930s Reds, the early 1940s Dodgers and the late 1940s Yankees, and in 1978 the Veterans Committee elected MacPhail to the Hall.

That was 22 years ago, and MacPhail remains the last executive elected on the basis of his ability to put together a successful franchise. For whatever reasons, nobody really pays attention any more. In a few weeks, Sparky Anderson will likely be elected by the Veterans Committee, largely because of his success managing "The Big Red Machine," the Cincinnati Reds of the early and mid-1970s. But how many people can identify the GM of that club, the man who gave Sparky all those great players?

His name is Bob Howsam, and nobody's putting him in the Hall of Fame. Shouldn't John Schuerholz be considered someday, given that he was largely responsible for building the greatest team of the 1990s (not to mention a pretty good team in the 1980s)? Note to the Hall of Fame: Devote less energy to electing pretty good players from the 1930s, and more to electing great general managers of the last 50 years. You might not make many friends, but it's the right thing to do.

THURSDAY, FEB. 10

Minds are like parachutes. They only function when they are open.

-- Lord Dewar

No, I don't have any idea who Lord Dewar was. But I ran across this quote the other day, and it made a lot of sense to me, probably because I read so much e-mail every day, much of which is, quite frankly, the product of closed minds.

On the other hand, good days bring healthy measures of open minds, or at least they bring something that makes me open my mind. To wit:

Rob, How can you give Pat Gillick a free pass into the top two of your list without at least mentioning his less than sterling moves in Baltimore. I realize that the club was successful when he was around and that Angelos is always meddling, but when I think of Gillick in Baltimore I think of acquisitions like Joe Carter, Ozzie Guillen and Bobby Bonilla. Hey, if you really wanna have a fun column, why don't you do baseball's five worst GMs? I think it'd be great. Of course, I'm not the guy who's gotta write the columns. As a Mets fan, I have been given ample reason this offseason to argue for Steve Phillips' inclusion in that dubious quintet. Plus I'd just love to hear what you've got to say about old Herk. -- Sean

Thanks, Sean. Your message incorporates three themes I wanted to cover today. But in fairness to a number of other correspondents, I should note that others made the same points, if singly.

OK, about Gillick ... I agree completely, I was too hasty in naming him as one of baseball's top five general managers. Sean is right, Gillick did some ridiculous things in Baltimore, signing washed-up veterans like Carter, Guillen and Bonilla, not to mention those twin train wrecks of the pitcher's mound, Doug Drabek and Norm Charlton. (Humorous aside: In 1998, their only season in Baltimore, Drabek and Charlton posted 7.29 and 6.94 ERAs, respectively.) Granted, Peter Angelos didn't exactly give Gillick a free hand, but just as Gillick gets some of the credit for the Orioles' success, he has to get some of the blame for their failures.

Since coming to Seattle, Gillick has signed the following veteran players: Mark McLemore (35), Jay Buhner (35), John Olerud (31), Arthur Rhodes (30) and Aaron Sele (29). Oh, and Gillick also figured out a way to pay $2.5 million for a "leadoff man" with a .309 career on-base percentage.

Taken as a group, you have like the talent Gillick acquired. But it should be remembered that he had the money to spend, and he had a geographical advantage when trying to sign Olerud and Sele. Anyway, all things considered I don't believe that Gillick has done enough in the last three years to warrant a place among the game's top five general managers. I might change my mind when we find out which prospects the Mariners are getting for Griffey, but until then he can't rank higher than about No. 8. This team needs to get younger, and Gillick's the one to make it happen.

As for Steve Phillips, on balance he's done a fine job, the recent acquisition of Derek Bell notwithstanding. Most of his other trades have worked out extraordinarily well. It was Phillips who brought Mike Piazza, Robin Ventura and John Olerud aboard. And how many other GMs were willing to give Rick Reed another shot? So no, I certainly wouldn't consider him among the five worst general managers, not even close. Is Phillips one of the five best? Not sure about that, but he's in the mix of contenders.

With Gillick out, I will bow to overwhelming e-mail demand and give Brian Sabean the nod. Or at least a nod. Sabean's only been the man in San Francisco for three years, which really isn't long. He has made some good trades, though: Matt Williams and Trenidad Hubbard for Jeff Kent, Julian Tavarez, Jose Vizcaino and a million bucks; six minor leaguers for Wilson Alvarez, Roberto Hernandez and Danny Darwin; Darryl Hamilton and a couple of throw-ins for Ellis Burks. Now, if Sabean could just get past his obsession with J.T. Snow's defense, develop some young hitters, and get Dusty Baker to stop abusing young starting pitchers. ... Seriously, I just don't see quite enough to place Sabean among the elite, though given his financial resources he certainly has done well enough.

As for the five worst GMs ... well, it's tough to pick five. Once you get past the six or eight best, I can't say that I'd want many of the others running my favorite team. Actually, one of the others does run my favorite team; Herk Robinson is by all accounts a nice guy, but completely out of his element as a general manager. That the Royals haven't completely fallen apart is due to some intelligent men in charge of player development. And I guess Robinson deserves credit for letting those men do their jobs.

Aside from Herk, my pick for worst GM is Detroit's Randy Smith. He's been a GM for six full seasons, and his teams have a combined 383-525 record. One of his clubs went 47-70 ('94 Padres), another went 53-109 ('96 Tigers). Not one of his clubs has won more games than it lost. Yet this man is given scores of millions of dollars to play with every year like it was Monopoly money. You can talk about limited resources all you like, but this is ridiculous.

Pittsburgh's Cam Bonifay has done some really strange things the last few years, rushing young players and signing old players, although the Pirates have hovered around .500 despite obvious financial restrictions. Cubs GM Ed Lynch has done almost nothing to impress me. And then there's Kevin Malone, who has done almost nothing right since taking over in Los Angeles.

So for you completists out there, that's five. If I've offended anyone or anything, then I'm truly sorry from the bottom of my insincere heart.

FRIDAY, FEB. 11
For a parallel to yesterday's Ken Griffey Jr. trade, we need look no further than last November, when the Texas Rangers traded a 30-year-old, two-time MVP outfielder for a quartet of unproven players, including a young starting pitcher with great talent but an uneven track record.

But that trade was, in at least one meaningful way, different than this one. The Rangers didn't have to trade Juan Gonzalez; they could have kept him for a spell, and either traded him during the season or let him depart as a free agent after the season, which would have netted the club a pair of high draft picks. Sure, he'd have been a distraction in the clubhouse, but since he was never really a leader there, the effect would have been fairly subdued.

It would have been different with Griffey, who for years has ruled the Mariner locker room like a private fiefdom. Which hats do we wear today? Ask Junior. Which movie goes into the VCR? Ask Junior. How close should the right-field fence be? Oops, we forgot to ask Junior. And now he can't stop complaining about it.

Well, if The Kid got worked up over a ballpark, what would he have done if the Mariners hadn't traded him? Right, it would have been the Pacific Northwest's biggest distraction since ... well, since the same thing happened with Randy Johnson during the 1998 season.

So Mariners general manager Pat Gillick felt compelled to trade Griffey, if only for the sake of clubhouse harmony.

For perhaps the best parallel to this deal, we must go back nearly 23 years, to the summer of 1977. On June 15, just hours before the trading deadline, the New York Mets traded Tom Seaver to the Cincinnati Reds for pitcher Pat Zachry, infielder Doug Flynn, and outfielders Steve Henderson and Dan Norman. Of these four, only Henderson was regarded as a top prospect, and he did enjoy a pretty decent career.

Their magical 1969 season aside, Tom Seaver was just about all the Mets had ever had. In huge headlines, The New York Post trumpeted, "Mets Trade THE Franchise."

Why did they trade him? In 1976, Seaver signed a three-year, $675,000 contract that made him the highest-paid pitcher in the game. A year later, the first big crop of free agents hit the market and suddenly Seaver wasn't the highest-paid anything. This rankled him, so -- according to Seaver -- he asked the Mets to tack on a couple of extra years and $700,000. When they refused, he requested a trade. But after some last-minute negotiations the Mets agreed to the contract extension, and for a few hours everything was copacetic.

Then came the famous column written by Dick Young in the New York Daily News. On July 15, the morning before the trade deadline, Seaver learned of Young's column, which read in part: "Nolan Ryan is getting more money than Tom Seaver and that galls Tom because Nancy Seaver and Ruth Ryan are very friendly and Tom Seaver has long treated Ryan like a little brother."

Seaver and Young had long been feuding, but this particular column sent Seaver over the edge. He immediately called the Mets and yelled, "Get me out of here! Get me out of here!"

And so they did.

As with most relationships that end acrimoniously, there was plenty of blame to go around. Seaver reacted petulantly to something in a newspaper. Dick Young stirred things up just for the sake of stirring things up. And maybe, just maybe, the Mets could have dealt with Seaver's contract concerns a bit more adroitly.

And today? It's 23 years later and again the Reds are the lucky ones, but this time it's not as easy to divvy up the blame.

There's no devilish columnist, sitting behind his old Underwood, rubbing his hands together and muttering, "Exxxxcellent."

Griffey might be a tad immature, but at least he wasn't complaining about his salary; in fact, given the contract that he did sign with Cincinnati, money was apparently the least of his concerns.

As for the Mariners, there's probably not much they could have done, aside from moving the fences and replacing Lou Piniella with Ken Griffey Sr.

But what rankles me, as a Mariners season-ticket holder, is the endgame. It's one thing to virtually demand a trade, but quite another to specify a single team, because of course that leaves your current club with almost zero leverage.

And that's how the Mariners lost one of the great players of our time, and gained a package roughly comparable to that received by the Mets back in 1977. Mike Cameron? He's Steve Henderson with experience. Brett Tomko? Not a bad comp for Pat Zachry, though Tomko does have a bigger up-side. Antonio Perez may likely turn into Doug Flynn, a career utility guy, while Jake Meyer may never enjoy major-league meal money.

All in all, the Mariners did a little better than the Mets did 23 years ago. But any time you trade a true superstar and don't get one in return, you're going to come out on the wrong side of the talent equation. The math might not make sense, but one great player is worth far more than four good ones. Why? Because it's a lot easier to find good players than great ones.

Had Gillick been able to shake loose Travis Dawkins or Rob Bell from the Reds, this trade would look good for both sides. But Gillick could not get one of those top prospects, and for that Jim Bowden deserves plaudits. He got Junior, and he really didn't give up anything that he wanted to keep. With Griffey in center field, Cameron is surplus. Jack McKeon and pitching coach Don Gullett feuded with Tomko all season. Perez is an 18-year-kid with potential, but it will be three years before we know anything. And Meyer is a 25-year-old relief pitcher who hasn't done anything above Class A.

Throw in the fact that the Reds will pay Griffey well below market value for at least nine years, and suddenly we've got our first serious candidate for General Manager of the 21st Century.

Finally, a word on Junior's contract ... First, I think we should hold our applause until we see if he's still happy in five years, when there are 30 or 40 major leaguers making more money than he is.

That said, it's possible that we'll see more deals like this, players taking less than market value in order to play close to home and/or family. It makes a certain amount of sense, if you figure that once the dollars get high enough, a few more dollars may seem irrelevant. If so, the teams in Southern California, Arizona, Texas and Florida should have an advantage because a huge percentage of major league players hail from those states.

Minnesota and Milwaukee? Let them eat cake, as usual.

MONDAY, FEB. 14
The Cincinnati Reds are now most everyone's pick to win the National League Central this season. But should they be?

Let's look at the Reds, position by position.

1B, Sean Casey: Casey was probably a little bit over his head last year, but then he's only 25 and figures to get better. So it's reasonable to think he'll be about as good this year as he was last.

2B, Pokey Reese: This guy was so far over his head in 1999 that he'll need a safety net to catch his fall in 2000. Reese posted a 747 OPS last year, and he'll be lucky to clear 700 this year.

SS, Barry Larkin: I'm of two minds about Larkin. His numbers last season were poor, by his standards. A fine .390 on-base percentage, but just a .420 slugging percentage, the fourth-lowest of his career and his worst since 1994 (.419). Simply a sign of age? Perhaps, but Larkin also set a career high by playing in 161 games. My guess is that his percentage stats will be better, but he'll spend at least a few weeks on the disabled list, for an overall wash in value.

3B, Aaron Boone: Boone's an OK player, no star potential but worth keeping around until the club develops a kid. We should expect roughly the same performance this season.

LF, Dante Bichette: Below are two left fielders from 1999, both of them connected to the Reds in some fashion ...

                 Games   OBP  Slug    OPS
Left Fielder A    151   .354  .541    .895
Left Fielder B    153   .347  .535    .882

Nearly identical, right? Of course, the punchline here is that Left Fielder A is Dante Bichette, and he did half his hitting at Coors Field. Left Fielder B is Greg Vaughn, who did half his hitting at Cinergy Field. My buddy Lance McAllister, who hosts a show on Cincinnati's WBOB Radio -- 1160 on your AM dial -- never tires of pointing out that Bichette's lifetime batting average in Cincinnati is .328, along with great power. But Lance, it's only 122 at-bats. And guess what? Bichette has gone just 7-for-31 (.226) the past two seasons in Cincinnati.

Jim Bowden has made a lot of smart moves, but he got this one wrong. Removed from Coors Field, Bichette will give the Reds sub-par production at his position, and represents a significant downgrade from Vaughn.

CF, Ken Griffey Jr.: This one you know about. Believe it or not, I think Mike Cameron might be a better defensive center fielder at this point. But who cares? Griffey's good for 50-plus home runs, and he's worth approximately five extra wins (Cameron was very good last year).

RF, Dmitri Young: About the same age as Casey, and like Casey, Young's a talented hitter with room yet to grow. Unfortunately, Young doesn't throw well and is miscast in right field. Actually, he doesn't field well, either, and is miscast anywhere aside from the batter's box. Griffey's going to be ranging far and wide (i.e. left and right) making plays that most center fielders wouldn't have to.

Catcher, Eddie Taubensee: Talk about a guy that got ignored. Taubensee played 126 games and slugged .521 last season. Catchers often develop their offensive skills late, so even though Taubensee's 31, his power surge may be for real. He also batted .311, and is unlikely to match that mark. Taubensee is backed up by Jason LaRue, who's generally been overrated as a prospect.

Starting Pitching: The Reds don't have that one guy, the true ace that you slot for Game 1 of your first postseason series. They do have a solid first two in Denny Neagle and Pete Harnisch. While neither are sure things, they're both pretty good bets to pitch well this year. Most of the rest of the starts last year went to three pitchers: Steve Parris (11-4, 3.50), Ron Villone (9-7, 4.23) and Steve Avery (6-7, 5.16). Avery won't be back, which of course is a plus.

The other two guys ... well, I'll be somewhat surprised if either of them wins more than he loses, let alone both of them.

As Ron Shandler points out, there are three reasons to consider Villone a high risk: 1. He pitched as many innings in 1999 as in the three previous seasons combined; 2. Aside from allowing just one home run in his first 57 innings, his stats really weren't so great; 3. He declined significantly in the second half.

If you don't follow the game closely, you might think Parris is a kid. But he's 32, and has pitched only 336 major league innings. On the other hand, in two seasons with the Reds he's 17-9 with a 3.60 ERA. Some people just bloom late, and maybe Parris is one of them. Still, he's far from a sure thing.

With Brett Tomko gone, that leaves the fifth slot open with the leading candidates apparently being prospect Rob Bell, ex-Pirate Elmer Dessens or a converted reliever like Dennys Reyes or Scott Williamson.

Relief Pitching: This is where Reds fans should be worried. A year ago, the top three Cincinnati relievers -- Williamson (12-7, 2.41, 19 saves), Danny Graves (8-7, 3.08, 27 saves) and Scott Sullivan (5-4, 3.01) -- were worked very hard by modern standards, combining for 318 innings. Let me stress that I am not criticizing Jack McKeon for this. He did what he thought he had to do, and it very nearly resulted in a postseason berth. And frankly, on a manager's list of things to worry about, the long-term health of his relief pitchers should rank somewhere near the bottom. Nevertheless, for most of us there is a next year, and this next year could mean trouble for the bullpen. They posted an NL-best 3.36 ERA in 1999, and that's going to increase by at least half a run in 2000, probably more.

So let's add everything up. Replacing Cameron with Griffey is a big plus. Replacing Vaughn with Bichette is a minus. Pokey Reese's likely offensive decline is a minus. It's highly unlikely that Cincinnati's bullpen will again be the best in the National League, so that's a minus (at least).

So we've got one big plus and three minuses. Before the Reds acquired Griffey, I was figuring them for roughly 84 wins, with the potential for a sub-.500 record. Adding Junior is worth five or six, and that pushes the Reds back into contention. But the favorites in the Central? I still say the line forms behind the Astros.

TUESDAY, FEB. 15
Today's subject might be better suited to a Stats Class, but this does bear upon a number of recent columns, so please indulge me.

I have discovered, these last few weeks, a basic law of baseball fandom. If it gives you pleasure, you may call it Rob's Third Law:

Fans of a team overwhelmingly think that improvement will be followed by improvement.

That's to say, after a team improves measurably from one season to the next, you'll have to search far and wide to find a fan who thinks his team will regress the following season. This tendency is quite natural. Shoot, fans tend to be optimistic every spring even when their favorite team lost 100 games last year. If their team, out of the blue, won close to 100 games last year ... well, Katy bar the door and start printin' them World Series tickets.

And to be sure, it does happen sometimes. But how often? Let's take a look at recent clubs that have improved significantly in the 1990s. All we have to do is record each team's victories for each three-season span. It's a little tricky in the '90s, for a couple of reasons. One, the labor strife in 1994 and 1995 blows a four-season hole in our sample (think about it). And two, the economic conditions of the last few years, especially, have led to the premature dismantling of some fine clubs. But we'll discuss that later.

Right now, let's focus on the teams that improved by at least eight games from one season to the next (excluding those strike-marred campaigns). There have been 26 such teams, but to forestall the obvious criticism, I'll go ahead and delete the 1998 Marlins and the 1999 Padres from the data set, since neither club really had any chance (and both declined precipitously).

So now we've got 24 teams. What did they do in Years 1, 2 and 3?

The 24 teams averaged 73.4 wins in Year 1, 89.4 in Year 2, and then 83.4 in Year 3. That is, they averaged a 16-win improvement from Year 1 to Year 2, then a six-game decline from Year 2 to Year 3.

Of the 24 teams, seven improved in Year 3 and two held steady. In case you don't feel like doing the math, this means that 15 of the 24 teams declined in Year 3. Eight of them -- a third -- declined precipitously, by at least 14 victories.

The most common follow-up was relative stasis. Of the 24 teams in the study, exactly half came within five victories, either to the better or worse, of matching their previous season's total.

What can we take from all this? Well, the so-called "Plexiglass Principle" certainly does exist, but the Year 3 declines generally aren't nearly as large as the Year 2 improvements. To take one example, just because the Reds improved by 19 victories last year, we shouldn't expect them to decline by 19 this year. By the same token, it's unreasonable to expect actual improvement from the Reds, Junior notwithstanding. Of the dozen teams in the study that improved by 15-plus games in Year 2, only four improved at all in year 3.

Speaking of the Cincinnatis, you'd probably like to know which teams improved by at least eight games last year. Aside from the Reds (+19), there were the Indians (+8), the Diamondbacks (+35, tops in the 1990s), the Pirates (+9), the Athletics (+13), the Mets (+9) and the Marlins (+10).

To tell you the truth, before doing this study I'd have predicted declines for each of these teams. But that's quite obviously not realistic. History suggests that two or three of the seven will improve this season, though probably not to a great degree. I've already been ripped by fans of the Reds and Mets for fans predicting (slight) declines, so I might as well give the readers in Cleveland, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Oakland and Florida their shots at me, too. The rest of this week, then, will be spent trying to figure out which of these teams won't regress in 2000.

I see we've still got a bit of time today, so let me present a letter from one of the more courteous Reds fans I've run across in the last 24 hours ...

Rob, Please compare the 1999 Astros to the 2000 Astros like you did the Reds. They lost Mike Hampton and Lima-time has the stability of a Jenga game being played on Tony Hawk's skateboard. Notice Lima's late-season slip? Fatigue? Possibly, but maybe the scouting reports picked up Jose's fatal flaw: when he gets behind early he melts down. I'm not saying that H-town isn't going to contend, but to pick them over the Reds without the same year-to-year comparison isn't like you. I see the Cards, Reds and 'Stros in a three-way battle for the division well into September and I think the wild card will come from this division as well. Keep up the good work. Steve in Cincinnati

Well, I don't really want to run the year-to-year comparison for every team. But here's what I see when I look at Houston:

I see a club with great outfield depth, despite the loss of Carl Everett. They've got Roger Cedeno and Richard Hidalgo for speed and defense, they've got Daryle Ward and Lance Berkman to smite the ol' horsehide, and Moises Alou is expected back. Alou's uncertain recovery and Ward's certain posterior aside, any one of these five could start for most clubs.

I see a club with solid pitching. Now perhaps I give the coaching staff too much credit, but in recent seasons that staff has turned a number of question marks into quality starters, and that's why I wouldn't be shocked if Octavio Dotel winds up pitching nearly as well as Mike Hampton this year. They've still got Shane Reynolds, Jose Lima, Scott Elarton ... the Reds would kill for these guys.

I see a club that won 97 games last year ... even though the lineup was decimated by injuries. Alou missed the entire season. Hidalgo played only 108 games. Ken Caminiti missed half the season. The starting shortstop played only 85 games. Everett missed a few weeks. For a brief spell, the Astros had three infielders starting in the outfield. My point here is that most 97-win teams have almost everything go right. Well, the Astros had a lot of things go wrong. And that's why I think they still have to be considered the favorites in their division, though the Cardinals and Reds certainly do have fighting chances.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 16
As we saw yesterday, seven teams improved by eight or more wins from 1998 to 1999. Those teams were the Indians (+8), Pirates (+9), Mets (+9), Marlins (+10), Athletics (+13), Reds (+19) and Diamondbacks (+35).

As we also saw yesterday, realistically we can expect a third of these teams to drop off seriously in 2000, a third of them to drop off slightly, and a third of them to improve slightly.

The rest of this week, I will attempt the impossible, which is to accurately project each of those seven teams for one of those three slots.

After visiting the Reds yesterday, today we visit the Cleveland Indians. I'm not going to mention every position individually, so let's start at the top ... the top of the order, that is. And this year we'll see significantly lower production from Cleveland's top three hitters. Here they are now, along with their ages and on-base percentages in 1999:

                   Age   OBP
1. Kenny Lofton     32  .405
2. Omar Vizquel     32  .397  
3. Roberto Alomar   31  .422

Lofton hurt himself during the postseason while making one of those ridiculously stupid head-first slides into first base, and will miss at least two months of the season. Vizquel set career highs in on-base percentage and slugging percentage. So did Alomar.

So it seems highly likely that the Indians will get less from each of these spots in the batting order.

Cleveland can expect better production from the corners, assuming Jim Thome can stay in the lineup. He was close to his usual self last year, but third baseman Travis Fryman played only 85 games, and he was pretty lousy when he did play. A healthy Fryman comes close to making up for a missing Lofton.

The hitting spots are solid, with Dave Justice, Manny Ramirez and Richie Sexson. It's unrealistic to expect Ramirez to duplicate his incredible 1999 stats, but Sexson figures to pick up some of the slack.

The Indians scored 1,009 runs last season, but this year that number will drop to the mid-900s. So can the pitching staff make up for it?

Chuck Finley replaces Doc Gooden in the rotation, which obviously is a big plus. Jaret Wright, assuming that he wins a rotation spot, can't be worse than he was last year. Shoot, even if he blows out his shoulder, his replacement from Triple-A will be better than Wright was last year. Dave Burba and Charles Nagy are who they are. And Bartolo Colon, if he's healthy, figures to maintain or get even better. What's more, I do think that a new manager might be a tonic for these guys.

The bullpen lost Mike Jackson, but he wasn't great anyway. Relief pitching doesn't figure to be a major strength or weakness.

I think the pitching will be a little better this year, enough to make up for at least some of the decrease in run production. The Indians won 97 games last year? They'll win 94 this year, due in part to improved teams in Kansas City and in the National League Central.

Speaking of the NL Central, the Pirates have been getting lost in the shuffle, haven't they?

Well, in a sense they should get lost in the shuffle because they don't have the juice to contend. That said, I do think they're a team that could actually follow last season's improvement with another improvement, perhaps from 78 wins to 82. Why?

They'll have a whole year of Jason Kendall, who missed half the season after breaking his ankle. Even if Kendall's not at full strength, he'll be better than his replacements were last year. Second baseman Warren Morris is good, and could get better. Brian Giles is very good, and should remain so. With Kris Benson, Jason Schmidt, Todd Ritchie and Francisco Cordova, the Pirates boast one of baseball's most exciting, if unsung, young pitching rotations.

All this is enough, I am sure, to kindle hope in the hearts of Pirates fans. But about the best they should hope for is a .500 record, because the Pirates have a lot of question marks. The corner outfielders, Wil Cordero and (for now) Al Martin, are mediocre. Third baseman Aramis Ramirez is going to be a fine player, but he's probably two or three years away from that. Pat Meares is Pat Meares.

If you're keeping score, here's the tally to this point:

            1998     1999     2000
Pirates      69    78 (+ 9)  82 (+4)    
Indians      89    97 (+ 8)  94 (-3)
Reds         77    96 (+19)  90 (-6)

Tomorrow, we'll continue this discussion with your New York Mets and your Florida Marlins. And remember that I still need to find two clubs that will seriously decline next season, and by "seriousl" I mean at least a dozen games to the bad. If you think it might be your favorite team, please let me know, because at this point I don't see any great candidates.